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MANAGEMENT CONTROL
IN SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS
While the concept of management control permeates the accounting litera-
ture, it is much less frequently encountered when applying accounting concepts
to the specific case of social organisations. Since we intently believe
in the importance of management control in a generalized accounting framework,
it is desirable to consider its applicability for social organizations and
any constraints that might impede the use of our traditional management
control concepts in this environment. These are the intentions of this
paper. The first part of the paper will discuss the concept of control, the
concept of the social organization, and the ways in which social organiza-
tions are traditionally differentiated from other types of organizations.
Subsequent sections of the paper will analyze the differences and common-
alities between social and other classes of organizations and the resulting
impact of these attributes in terms of the use and applicability of our
traditional management control concepts in social organizations.
Concept of Control
No matter what kind of organization we consider, social or profit-
seeking, the term organization connotes control. Control is an inevitable
correlate of organization. Although control has been variously defined, we
mean, "any process in which a person or group of persons or organization of
persons determines, i.e., intentionally affects, the behavior of another
person, group or organization." This broad definition of control can be
Tannenbaum (1968), p. S.

made more specific for our purposes by examining two aspects of control
introduced by Anthony (1965), namely, management control and operational
control.
Management control is "the process by which managers assure that
resources are obtained and used effectively and efficiently in the accom-
2
plishment of organizational objectives." According to Anthony this is a
process carried on within a framework established by strategic planning, i.e.,
the process whereby objectives are established. Management control, therefore,
is constrained by the overall long run organizational objectives and is
basically concerned with goal congruence between actions managers take and
the preferences of the set of individuals on whose behalf management is
acting.
Operational control is "the process of assuring that specific tasks are
3
carried out effectively and efficiently." The focus here is on individual
tasks or units, usually tasks or activities that are capable of being pro-
grammed. Just as management control takes place within the framework of
strategic planning, operational control takes place within the framework
of management control. The distinction between operational control and
management control is perhaps best illustrated by an example. In the
automobile industry, the control of the assembly of one particular car
efficiently is a problem of operational control. The question of the number
of cars to produce or the average daily rate of production is a problem of
management control.
Further insight to the control process is gained by examining the
2Anthony (1965), p. 2.
3
Anthony (1965), p. 7.
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decision paradigm suggested by Thompson (1967) . The dimensions of the
following figure represent beliefs concerning cause-effect relations (i.e.,
knowledge about the relationship between an action and its outcomes) and
preferences for outcomes (i.e., a preference function or preference ordering
Preferences for Outcomes
Certain Uncertain
Beliefs about Certain
Cause/Effect
Relations Uncertain
of the possible outcomes). These dimensions are viewed as continua but
for illustrative purposes only the extremes, designated certain and uncertain,
are considered. Doing so provides a 2 x 2 paradigm outlining possible
decision strategies.
In cell I cause-effect relations and preferences are both certain. In
this situation we have a computational strategy or a programmable decision.
This is the area where operational control can be employed. The major
decision anri control problems are d.-ta problems-- full, accurate and timely
information is crucial. In cell II a compromise strategy seems appropriate.
A good example of this is in prisons where therapeutic and custodial objec-
tives have to mesh. Although achieving either goal independently is rela-
tively straight forward, trying to satisfy both simultaneously creates
problems. The outcome is usually some compromise which may be achieved
first by emphasizing one goal and then the other. Judgemental strategies
for decision making are appropriate in cell III. Although it may be quite
clear what objectives are to be attained, the exact course to attain these
4Thompson (1967)

objectives is uncertain. For example, increasing profits in a corporation
may be desired result, but exactly how to achieve this end (e.g., reducing
costs, increasing revenues, extractiag more from present markets or moving
into new markets, etc.) requires the exercise of judgement. This cell, as
well as cell II, seems to be the area of management control, although we
might point out here that the two cells may require different techniques
to achieve control. Finally, the fourth cell calls for an inspirational
strategy in decision making. How to analyze or control decision making
in this area, if not impossible, is not obvious.
A distinguishing characteristic of managerial control as compared with
operational control relates to the underlying activities being controlled.
Managerial activities typically involve decision processes requiring sub-
stantial degrees of subjective decision-making. The complexity of this
control process increases as the organization grows in size and employs
managers with multiple loyalties and movitations. Given the attention
paid managerial control in the private sector, the complexity of the environ-
ment in which managerial control systems must be devised, the importance of
managerial control in achieving long-term organizational objectives, and
the rapid increase in the number and size of social organizations within
our society, it is appropriate that the applicability of our traditional
managerial control concepts be examined in the context of social organiza-
tions.
The Social Organization
The term "social organization" is an inclusive term describing all
purposeful organizations that cannot be classed as privately owned for-profit
organizations. It includes governmental units, private charitable organizations,

private not-for-profit hospitals and educational organizations, and not-for-
profit museums and cultural organizations among others. Whether the appli-
cation of management control concepts in social organizations is in any way-
distinct from its application in other organizations evolves into the con-
sideration of the difference, if any, between this type of organization
and the private, for-profit organization with which we customarily deal.
While the literature identifies a number of characteristics by which we may
differentiate these two classes of organizations, a careful examination
of these attributes reveals that they fail to be generalizable when examined
in the context of the entire scope of those entities classified as
social organizations.
When differentiating social organizations from private, for-profit
organizations, at least six major distinctions are normally drawn. These
are 1) the contrast between profit seeking organizations and those organi-
zations operating upon a not-for-profit basis, 2) our inability to system-
atically match revenue and costs in social organizations, 3) the contrast
between market and non-market organizations, 4) the lack of quantifiable or
measurable output within social organization and our resulting inability
to match revenue with the benefits produced, 5) the additional legal
constraints governing the operation and control of social organizations in
contrast to those applying to private, for-profit organizations, and 6) the
multitude of objectives, on the one hand, the the lack of articulated
objectives, on the other hand, within many social organizations. The balance
of this section of the paper will demonstrate that none of these distinc-
tions are uniformally valid when contrasting social organizations with
In varying combinations, these distinctions have been widely used in
the literature. For example, see Lynn (1974), p. 3; May (1975), p. 58;
Anthony (1975), p. 34; and American Accounting Association (1975), p. 17.

private, for-profit organizations.
The existence of a profit motive or the lack of a profit motive has
traditionally been used to contrast private firms operating for a profit
with other types of organizations. While many social organizations do in
fact operate upon a not-for-profit basis, the use of profit to distinguish
social organizations from other organizations fails in at least two respects.
First, though they may enjoy tax and other governmental ly dictated advantages,
social organizations such as turnpike authorities, publicly owned utilities,
parking authorities, convention center authorities, and a wide variety of
others are in fact operated upon a profit-making basis. Second, there are
a significant group of social organizations, such as hospitals and airports,
that internally finance their own capital expansion through the use of
reserve accounts while continuing to report no profit. As a consequence of
these numerous exceptions, distinguishing social and other types of organi-
zations upon the basis of whether profit is generated is simply inappropriate.
While our lack of ability to systematically match revenue and cost
serves to distinguish some social organizations from the majority of
profit seeking organizations, here r?p;ain, the distinction is far from
generalizable and in fact breaks down in two directions. A typical profit
seeking firm sells a specific product, whether manufactured or in resale,
for a stated sum. In this situation there is an established relationship
between the revenue received and the direct cost of making or acquiring the
product. At the other extreme we have the social organization, such as the
park district, which receives the bulk of its "revenue" from taxes and spends
this revenue on a variety of non-revenue producing services such as park
development and operation. In this later case we are missing our tradi-
tional ability to match revenues with costs. While such a contrast can be

drawn, other example run counter to the preceeding examples. Hospitals,
publicly owned utilities, and turnpike authorities, are examples of social
organizations that provide specific, identifiable services in return for
stated charges. In some of these organizations, such as hospitals, identifying
the benefits of such services remains a problem, but costs can quite adequately
be matched with revenue in a fashion very similar to that found in for-profit
organizations. Thus, the value of distinguishing social and other organi-
zations upon the basis of our ability or lack of ability to match revenue
with cost appears minimal.
Contrasting social organizations from profit-seeking organizations upon
the basis of whether it is a market or non-market organization is largely a
sematical distinction. This distinction has two implications. First, that
social organizations do not have a market, and second, that social organiza-
tions operate within a monopolistic framework and thus are not subject to the
pressures of a market economy. In regard to these points, virtually any
social organization serves both a defined market for its services and operates
within a market environment. The market for an educational system can be
defined in te"~ms of the skills required by designated age groups within a
defined geographic area. While some social organizations have been given
absolute monopolies, many have not. A state educational system still competes
with private educational institutions, whether parochial or not, and whether
charitable or for-profit. Park districts compete with a wide group of potential
leisure time pursuits and health care institutions clearly compete among them-
selves within the market for health care services. Even proprietary governmental
Still another way in which the market/non-market distinction is used is in
the sense that revenues frequently accrue to social organizations in a manner
not related to the market in which their goods and services are consumed.
Pondy (1970).

8organizations operate in the context of a social market and frequently do
compete with other organizations fulfilling similar needs. Thus, the market
discinction fails to differentiate so ial and provate, for-profit organizations
Certain social organizations: such as police and fire departments, the
court system, and those dealing in the areas of education and health care,
frequently find it difficult to measure and quantify the output of their
activity. This results in an inability to match revenue with the benefits
received. Other social organizations such as public utilities, highway programs,
and airport authorities produce rather tangible output and can, at least
within limits, match revenue with the output that generates revenue. On the
other hand, assertions that profit-seeking firms can uniformally measure and
quantify their output are far from true. Many profit-seeking organizations
including those providing professional services, consulting services, banking
and financial services, insurance services and others, can quantify their
output in only the most general fashion. As a consequence our ability or
lack of ability to quantify the output of our social organizations does not
appear to be satisfactory in terms of distinguishing social organizations from
other organizations.
While some social organizations such as governmental units do operate
within the constraints of legal controls more complex than those imposed in
regard to profit-seeking firms, any generalizations in terms of differientiating
these organizations from profit-seeking organizations upon this basis is far
from satisfactory. The degree to which the legal constraints of social organi-
zations vary from those placed upon profit-seeking organizations are not
generalizable. There are significant differences between various types of
social organizations, for example, as between governmental units and private
charities, in terms of the degree of legal constraints under which they must

operate. Some social organizations, such as private charities, in all likeli-
hood operate with the fewest legal constraints of any type of organization,
whether social or profit-seeking. Finally, the legal constraints that apply
to profit-seeking firms do not necessarily have universal application- Some,
such as security regulations, apply only to a limited class of profit-seeking
organizations, and thus, this basis for differentiating social and profit-
seeking organizations is unsatisfactory.
The last of the traditional differentiations made concerning social and
profit-seeking organizations focuses upon their alledged multiplicity of
objectives on the one hand and their lack of formulated, articulated objectives
on the other. Upon examination, neither of these characteristics appears to
be generalizable. Many special purpose governmental organizations, whether
they be drainage authorities, road districts, or others, have very specific,
well-formulated objectives. While we may fail to do an adequate job of
comparing their performance with their objectives, their objectives do exist.
Whether we are talking about school districts, hospitals, police departments,
or welfare organizations, objectives exist for most social organizations, though
we may have failed to articulate them. Our inability or failure to measure
the output and evaluate the efforts made toward fulfilling objectives should
not be confused with a lack of the existence of objectives. In regard to
the alledged multitude of objectives within social organizations, this problem
most often arises in the context of governmental organizations and then arises
more as a result of our failure to differentiate between primary and secondary
governmental objectives and to articulate objectives in terms of specific
governmental units and programs. Furthermore, most profit-seeking organiza-
tions themselves do not have a unidimensional profit objective but rather
operate within the framework of multiple objectives which may or may not be
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articulated. Since none of the traditional means of differentiating social
and profit-seeking organizations is satisfactory, the balance of this paper
will explore more novel ideas concerning the differentiation of these two
classes of organizations and their implication concerning the use of mana-
gerial control.
The Decision Analysis Setting
One common feature of the organizations we are studying is the delegation
of responsibility by some set of supra-actors (e.g. owners or boards of
directors in profit oriented concerns; voters or other representatives in
governmental organizations; contributors or boards of directors in charities,
etc.) to a set of actors which may be referred to as the management of the
organization, The central and recurring problem that arises is how to
obtain goal congruence between these actors who have accepted the delegated
responsibility and those actors who have delegated the responsibility.
The traditional answers to this problem come from two major disciplines-
economics and psychology. From economics, we are given the idea of the
rational man attempting to maximize the expected returns of the organization
From psychology we obtain the theories on motivation with their strongly
non-rational (in terms of the economic man) flavour. The former is normative
while the latter is descriptive. The intent of this section is to introduce
the notion of risk- sharing, which has its foundations in both disciplines,
and to demonstrate its applicability for the analysis of management control
strategies in the organizations under discussion.
One paradigm within which to view risk- sharing is a decision framework
where the actors share in the returns they jointly produce. This framework
is the familiar state, act, outcome representation presented by Savage
(1954). Some act, aeA, must be selected. Exactly what outcome, denoted

11
xeX, will follow the selection of a particular act is unknown. This
uncertainty is encoded in a state variable denoted seS. Thus x p(s,a)
represents the outcome from choosing act a and state s being revealed.
Given the sti.te and action domains, He outcome, the probability assess-
ments of the actor over the states, (J>(s), and the utility function, u(x),
the preferred action choice of the individual, a*eA, is located by selection
of the action choice associated with the maximum expected value of utility.
That is:
E(u/a*) = ^ / u(p(s,a))(j)s (1)
We begin the analysis by taking a very simplified organizational setting
7
and showing what is meant by risk-sharing in this setting. The analysis
is restricted to two actors, one, an owner, who has delegated responsibility
for choosing an action to another, the manager. The manager is rewarded
for his performance. The basic, problem is how the manager should share the
risks associated with acting in an uncertain environment, i.e., whether or
not the reward function of the manager should be tied to the uncertain
state. Again, for simplicity, we take the outcome as being simply monetary,
i.e., net cash flows to the organisation, and consequently, risk- sharing is
operationalized in this setting as sharing rules for the uncertain net cash
flows. 8
7The analysis here parallels one presented by Demski (1975). The
interested reader is referred to the Demski paper for a complete understanding
of the concept and of the Demski examples discussed subsequently.
c
Although the setting here is quite narrow, the characterization of
the utility function and the setting could obviously be expanded. The
restricted setting is used as this is notationally convenient.
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Let the organizational outcome, net cash flow, be denoted by x, the
residual share of the owner as x , and the share of the manager as x. . Let
I(') denote an incentive or reward i .iheme dependent up^n the actual state,
s, the actual monetary return generated, x, and the action, a, the manager
selects. Then the monetary remuneration of the manager, x^, is given by
xj = I(x,s,a), Similarly, the monetary return to the owner is reduced by
the amount paid to the manager; xQ = x-X]_. Hence, for a specific incentive
scheme, the manager's action is determined by:
E(u/I,a*) * Max f s y 1 (i(P Cs,a),s,a))4> ,Cs) (2)
where U}(x) denotes his utility function and 4>^(s) his state probability
assessment.
Notice, that the owner cannot affect u^O) or 4>i(s). However, since
the owner does select the incentive scheme (function) and since the solution
to equation (2) provides a functional relationship between the action choice
of the manager and various incentive schemes (i.e., a -- f (I)), the owner's
problem can be formulated as:
E(u /I) = 1^ /s u (p(s,f(I) - I(s,a))* s (3)
where u (x) denotes his utility function and
<f>
(s) his state probability
assessments.
Demski (1975) has shown how by altering the incentive scheme the owner
can change the expected utility of both himself and the manager and, there-
fore, the action of the manager. This demonstrates that, the owner can mani-
pulate the amount of risk each is willing to bear by manipulating the
Q
incentive scheme. This is illustrated by Demski in the following simplified
example. Consider a two person contracting organization (owner and manager)
9
That this, in general, can be done is obvious from the formulation
above.
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whose net cash flow is generated according to the equation x = l-2s - a -
2(s-a) where,
(i) (1 >2s) = the uncertain ca: 1 flows generated from a fixed contract,
(ii) s = the uncertain capacity demanded by the contractor under
the contract,
(iii) a = the cost of providing the capacity of the contractor
at $1 per unit
(iv) 2(s-a) = the cost associated with an incorrect capacity decision
but only where a < s.
Consider now two incentive schemes, one where the manager receives
40% of the expected net cash flows (here the manager is protected from the
demand risk) and the other where the manager receives 42% of the actual net
cash flows (here the manager shares in the demand risk) . In the first case
the manager's expected utility Eu
,
(x) = .7071 and the owner's expected utility
Ey (x) = .8333. 10 In the second case Eu
x
(x) = .7183 and Eu (x) = .8441. Both
players have increased their expected utility by shifting some of the risk
(and expected return) from the owner to the manager. This illustrates
what we mean by risk sharing with the incentive scheme representing the
sharing rule.
The formulation above was predicated upon the idea that the reward
function of the manager was dependent upon the action he selected, the
actual state that occurred, and the actual return generated. Now consider
the same general model except that the manager will receive simply a lump
sum payment, L. That is, his reward is independent of the act selected,
the actual state, and the return generated. The managers rather trivial
xuBoth owner and manager have identical power (x *) utility functions.
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decision problem is now:
EtPj/a*) = Nax /g Pi (L)$os - U]L (L) (4)
On the other hand, the decision pro! em of the owner ir:
E(tf /L) = M« /s /a (p(s,a) - L)<j> s* a (5)
Notice again that the owner cannot affect u^Cx) or (^(s). However, unlike
the first formulation, the solution to equation (4) does not constrain the
action choice of the manager. That iSj there is no functional relationship
between the incentive scheme (say, various levels of L) and the action
choice of the manager. This complicates substantially the control problem
of the owner for it eliminates one important mechanism- -that of risk- sharing.
The essence of risk- sharing is shown in the first, formulation. In
that formulation, the manager shares in the uncertainty attached to the
outcomes. His reward is structured so. that it depends upon an uncertain
occurrence. That is, for a price (reward) the manager will share the risk
associated with the uncertain outcome. This, therefore, constrains him
to certain maximizing actions. (In the Demski (1975) example to the action
a = .45.) Notice that the owner has in effect induced certain actions (i.e.,
to take a = .45) by appropriately structuring the reward function. Analytically,
this enables the owner to derive his own E (Uo) from investing in the
organization and provides some basis for posterior evaluations. In the
second formulation (equations 4 and 5), the reward of the manager is independent
of both states and actions, i.e., is independent of the outcomes. Here the
manager shares none of the outcome uncertainty. Consequently, he is constrained
to no particular action.
Technically, our formulations are single period models that may not
hold for multiple periods unless there are some contextual constraints which
essentially convert the multi-period situation to a series of independent
single period problems.
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In summary, in the first formulation the owner by choosing that
reward scheme was able to induce the manager to take a certain action which
was congrueir with the preference function of the owner. In the second
foundation the reward scheme does not induce any particular action (i.e.,
the action that would maximize the E (Uo) of the owner) although it would
be possible for the manager to choose such an appropriate action, It would
appear that risk- sharing is a sufficient condition for goal congruence
although not a necessary condition. Having presented the basic risk-
sharing formulation, the final section of the paper will access its impli-
cations in regard to utilizing traditional management control strategies
in the context of social organizations.
The Use of Management Control Techniques in Social Organizations
Given the expectation that the goals of the organization and its managers
will be in conflict, management control techniques become invaluable in our
efforts to achieve goal congruence. Among the strategies we have designed
for this purpose are performance evaluation, cost centers, responsibility
accounting, and profit-sharing. While these strategies are multiple, one
of their common characteristics is the assumption that some mechanism or
form of risk-sharing exists between the organization and its managers. It
is the ability to manipulate risk and returns, which is essential for the
operationalization of our traditional management control strategies.
While numerous attempts have been made to apply our traditional
management control strategies to social organizations or device substitutes
12for these traditional strategies for social organizations, these attempts
generally fail to recognize a fundamental difference between social and private.
1 o
"For example, see King (1970) p, 43.
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for-profit organizations. This difference relates to the relationship
between the owner (superactor) and his managers and the resulting infeasi-
bility of management control systems requiring risk-sharing. For a variety
structural and behavioral reasons, social organizations generally find it
difficult, if not impossible, to share risk between their owners and their
managers and as a consequence, find traditional managerial control strategies
of limited usefulness. These reasons will now be explored.
First, in many social organizations there is no mechanism to distribute
risk. There is no profit; therefore, there is no reward to share between
the actors and the superactor. Budgets are normally rigid with little
budgeting discretion once the budget has been approved by the superactors
or funding agencies outside the organization. Other than reserves for
contingencies, there are seldom non-allocated funds that might be used to
reward superior performance.
Second, in social organizations the relationship between the superactors
and the managers is distinctly different from that which exists in most
private, for-profit organizations. In charitable organizations the super-
actors are normally an unpaid, self-perpetuating, lay board with a limited
stake in the performance of the organization. Managers represent continuity
of the organization and are frequently immune from any substantial performance
evaluation. In governmental organizations, the superactors are generally
elected officials or political appointees. The manager is frequently
insulated from any effective threat to his position by civil service. Even
when civil service is not a factor, the rapid turnover at the "owers" level
frequently protects the manager from both the evaluation of his performance
and any threat to his job. Therefore, in the case of charities, there is
little incentive to share risk between the owner and the manager, and in the
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case of governmental organizations, structural impositions greatly limit
the effectiveness of any attempt to share risks regardless of the inclina-
tion to do s<~ by the owners.
Third, profit provides a means of evaluating individual performance
relative to organizationally set goals and thus provides a means of opera-
tionalizing our traditional managerial control strategies. While it may
be argued that profit measures but one organizational objective, over the
longer term profit is an acceptable surrogate for most organizational
objectives in private, for-profit organizations. Since profit does not
exist or is not recognized in most social organizations, the very opera
-
tionalization of most accepted managerial control techniques is greatly
jeapordized. Partially as a consequence such organizations have focused
upon cost and revenue analysis and numerous techniques, such as cost
effectiveness analysis and PPBS, which emphasize the establishment of
organizational objectives and periodic comparisons between these objectives
and the performance of managers. A common failing of such strategies from
a management control perspective remains the lack of any effective mechanism
for transferring risk to the manage! even if such strategies are successful
in evaluating his performance. Even greater problems arise when attempting
to use output measures to evaluate the performance of managers in social
organizations. Adequate quantitative and qualitative output measures have
simply not been developed for most social organizations whether they deal
with health, education, or other governmental and social concerns.
Fourth, the federal government through its tax laws encourages risk-
sharing based incentive schemes in private, for-profit organizations. The
import of the tax law provisions concerning profit-sharing is to treat sums
paid to employees in qualified profit-sharing plans as deductions to net
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income resulting in a reduction in corporate taxes. For most corporations,
this tax provision effectively means that 48% of the funds paid out in
profit-sharii.g plans represent taxes forgone by the government
.
x J While
these provisions can undoubtedly be justified in economic and social terms,
profit-sharing plans represent an ultimate mechanism for risk-sharing with
no comparable incentive available in the context of social organizations.
Fifth, there are several behavioral implications that arise as a
consequence of the difficulty of implimenting risk-sharing in social organi-
zations and tend to reinforce both the difficulty of applying managerial
control strategies based upon risk- sharing or developing alternative
strategies for use within this environment. Among these are the expecta-
tion that social organizations will attract managers who are themselves
extremely risk adverse. This expectation is reinforced by the nature of
most social organizations, the nature of their managerial positions, and
the environment in which they exist. The rewards for innovation are generally
minimal in social organizations. Since the opportunity for personal gain
is limited, social organizations are less likely to attract managers willing
to take the risk required to achieve substantial economic gain.
Summary
Whether or not there are risk-sharing mechanisms available to social
organizations remains to be explored. However, we have argued that there
are a priori grounds for believing that managerial control techniques
13 Profit- sharing amounts paid during the current year are deductible to the
payer. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §162 and 212. Profit-sharing anountspaid to a quali-
fied pension, profit-sharing, or stock bonus plan are ooth deductible to the payer
and deferred from taxation from the point of view of the recipient. Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, §401,402,404, and 501 . Stock options also receive favorable tax treat.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §421-425.
14As a consequence of the lack of risk faced by managers of social organi-
zations, lower compensation for management level employees may also result.
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presently useful in private, for-profit organizations will be of limited
usefulness in social organizations. The theoretical basis of this belief
relates to t.ie concept of risk-shari ig.
When decisions require the exercise of judgment, companies or judgmental
decision strategies are normally called for and the potential fGr conflict
between the goals of the decision-maker and the organization arises. Tradi-
tional management control techniques attempt to alleviate goal conflict by
adjusting the return shared by the organization and its managers. While many
distinctions are made as between private, for-profit organizations and social
organizations
,
the one meaningful distinction appears to be the difference
in the nature of ownership as between these two types of organizations
and its implication for utilizing management control techniques conceptually
based upon the risk-sharing concept. Among the difficulties of using such
control techniques in the environment of social organizations are 1) the
lack of a mechanism to distribute risk, 2) the differences in the relatisn-
ship between the superactors and the managers, 3) the lack of a means of
evaluating individual performance, 4) the lack of an incentive compariable
to that contained in the Federal tax law for private, for-profit organiza-
tions, and 5) the behavioral problems that arise as a consequence of the
difficulty of implimenting risk-sharing strategies in social organizations.

20
REFERENCES
American accounting Association, Report of the Committee on Not-for-
Profit Organizations," The Accounting Review (supplement to Vol. XLIX 1974),
pp. 225-249.
American Accounting Association, "Report of the Committee on Non-profit
Organizations," The Accounting Review (supplement, to Vol. XLX 1975), pp. 17-24.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Ob j ectives of
Financial Statements (New York: American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, Inc.,, 1973), pp. 49-51.
Robert N, Anthony, "Characteristics of Management Control Systems,"
in Robert U. Anthony, John Dearden and Richard F. Vancil, Management Control.
Systems -.Cases and Readings (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965)
Robert N. Anthony and Regina Her z linger, Management Control in Non -
profit Organ i z at ion
s
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1975),
pp. 34-58.
Joel S. Demski, "Evaluation Based on Controllable Performance," Graduate
School of Business, Stanford University, Mimeo (1975).
Joel S. Demski, Informat ion Ana 1 ys is (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley
Publishing Company, 1972),
Joel S. Demski, "Optimal Performance Measurement." Journal of Accounting
Research (Autumn, 1972), pp, 243-258.
M. E. Francis, "Accounting and the Evaluation of Social Programs,"
The Accounting Review (April. 1973), pp. 245-257.
Edward S. Lynn and Robert J. Freeman, Fund_.Accounting Theory and Practice
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974), pp. 1-12.
Barry G. King, "Cost-Effectiveness Analysis: Implications for Accountants,"
The Journal of Accountancy (March, 1970), pp. 43-49.
Robert G. May, Gerhard G. Mueller, and Thomas H. Williams, A Brief
Introduction to Managerial and Social Uses of Accounting (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1975),' pp. 58-62.
Louis R. Pondy.. "Toward a Theory of Internal Resource Allocation," in
Mayer N. Zald, Power in Organization s (1970).
L. J. Savage, The Foundation of Statistics fNew York: John Wiley § Co.,
1954).
Arnold S. Tannenbaum, Control in Organizations (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1968).
James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, 1967).





r-9*

